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THE LEGALITY OF TICKET TIE-INS IN
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
Arthur D. Austin*
I. INTRODUCTION
The dynamics of operating a "major" intercollegiate sports pro-
gram have a tenuous nexus with academic ideals. Intercollegiate
athletics is now a big business, dominated by the balance sheet of
gate receipts, T.V. revenues, and talent recruiting. The best high
school athletes are aggressively recruited for their physical prowess
to play for teams that perform before large crowds-and fre-
quently a national television audience-in gigantic stadiums and
fieldhouses. In many instances coaches and players gain national
recognition and reverence unequaled by professors, poets, or Nobel
prize winners. Yet the sponsors of these sports extravaganzas are
academic institutions who by charter and tradition are dedicated
to the ideals of teaching, scholarship, and research. By participat-
ing in the production and sale of intercollegiate sports entertain-
ment, academic institutions have been forced to confront the possi-
bility of negative tradeoffs. Inevitably, administrators must decide
whether the economic and social costs of intercollegiate athletics
justify continued participation in "big time" sports competition.
One economic cost is from new legal liabilities derived from the
existence of sports as a commercial activity." For example, meth-
* Edgar A. Hahn Professor of Jurisprudence, Franklin Thomas Backus School of Law,
Case Western Reserve University; B.S., University of Virginia, 1958; J.D., Tulane Univer-
sity, 1963.
1. See generally J. WsTAr & C. LowELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS (1979).
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ods used to sell season tickets may violate federal antitrust laws. A
survey by the author of fifty-six National Collegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation (NCAA) Division P schools revealed that thirteen institu-
tions use a system that requires buyers of season football tickets to
contribute to a scholarship or support fund in exchange for certain
benefits.3 For example, the University of Missouri gives first prior-
ity for football seating to persons who become members of the
Mizzou Athletic Scholarship Associates by making a financial con-
tribution. The plan provides for seven "membership levels . . .
with a schedule of benefits and tickets available for purchase based
upon the amount of contribution to the Mizzou Athletic Pro-
gram."4 The University of Virginia, not included in the survey,
uses a similar plan.
In reply to an inquiry, the author was cautioned by University of
2. Article 9 of the NCAA bylaws defines criteria for Division I membership. Division I
schools must adhere to scheduling, attendance, and stadium capacity requirements. 1980-81
MANuAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGiATE ATHLrIc ASSOCIATION § 9(1)(a), at 100-02 [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1980-81 MANUAL].
3. Several additional schools indicated that donations were "voluntary" or required in
"some" instances. The survey randomly polled schools in the major Division I Conferences,
including the Pacific 10, Southwestern, Southeastern, ACC, Big 10, plus some independents.
(Survey responses, on file with the author, were obtained under a pledge of confidentiality;,
thus identification of schools will not be divulged.) In some instances, ticket donation plans
have been publicized in the media. Time Magazine reports that "at North Carolina, demand
for season tickets is so high that the university limits their sale, in the case of non-students,
to people who have contributed at least $5,000 over the years to the school's athletic schol-
arship fund." TnME, April 7, 1980, at 79. According to The Sporting News, San Diego State
"AD Gene Bourdet announced that priority seating would be made available to those donors
who give at least $1,000 to the Aztec Athletic Foundation." The Sporting News, April 5,
1980, at 13.
Most schools supporting major-college athletics have similar programs. Arizona's
$1,000-a-year donors receive the option to buy 10 football and basketball season tick-
ets, parking in choice locations, a Wildcat Club golf sweater, a personalized plaque
and car decal, and all publicity newsletters and press guides.
The dues for membership in the Cardinal and Gold, Southern Cal's most prestigi-
ous alumni group, are a $500 minimum. At Clemson, money is raised by the IPTAY
Club. IPTAY was organized in 1934, and now stands for "I Pay Twenty a Year."
(Three years ago, inflation forced a hame change from "I Pay Ten a Year.")
All the money raised by the Maryland Education Foundation is used for athletic
scholarships. Contrary to popular belief, a school simply cannot afford to allow a
gifted athlete to attend free. The money for-his scholarship-approximately $3,000 a
year at Maryland, $4,000 a year at Southern Cal, and $5,000 a year at Harvard-is
paid by the athletic department
K. DENLINGER & L. SHAPino, AT awra FoR SALE 158-59 (1975).
4. 1979 Mizzou Football: Tiger Ticket Information (University of Missouri-Columbia).
TICKET TIE-INS
Virginia officials that acquiring a season basketball ticket "is quite
a difficult trick each year," 5 and that "special consideration will be
given to Virginia Student Aid Foundation and faculty members."
A brochure described the allocation system: "All VSAF privileges
are awarded by the VSAF Priority System. This system takes into
consideration the amount of contribution in one year, the total
monies contributed to the VSAF and loyalty to the VSAF."7 Ac-
cording to the VSAF formula, a maximum of 105 "points" can be
earned with the following combination: a yearly contribution of
$2500 or more (50 points), cumulative contributions of $15,000 or
more (35 points), and an annual contribution for ten consecutive
years (20 points). Hence, to get a season ticket one is required to
join the VSAF, contribute enough money to amass sufficient
"points" to gain "priority" status, and then pay the "regular" price
for thp tickets. The literature fails to provide information on the
approximate number of points needed to assure inclusion in the
"priority" group.
Forcing purchasers to contribute to athletic support funds such
as the Virginia Student Aid Foundation as a condition to getting a
season ticket may constitute an illegal tying arrangement under
the federal antitrust laws. Using the University of Virginia plan as
a model, this article will describe the legal basis for antitrust liabil-
ity. After first examining the "state action" defense, the article will
discuss some significant jurisdictional problems, followed by an
analysis of the substantive liability elements of a tying
arrangement.
U. TE "STATE ACTION" EXEMPTION
Many of the major college sports powers that use a ticket prior-
ity system are state institutions.8 The University of Virginia is ad-
ministered by the "Rector and Visitors of the University of Vir-
5. Letter from Dennis K. Womack, Ticket Manager, Dept. of Intercollegiate Athletics,
University of Virginia, to the author (June 11, 1979).
6. Id.
7. VSAF Priority System (information printed on the Virginia Student Aid Foundation
pledge card).
8. Of the thirteen schools which the survey revealed used the tying arrangements, eleven
were state institutions. The University of Virginia, which was not surveyed, is also a state
institution.
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ginia," a corporation "at all times subject to the control of the
General Assembly."' The delegation of authority from the state
government raises the possibility that the "state action" defense
may exempt the ticket restraints from the coverage of the federal
antitrust laws.
The state action exemption was judicially created in Parker v.
Brown,10 where the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act is
"a prohibition of individual and not state action"" and was there-
fore inapplicable to a rate-making program created and supervised
by the California state legislature. In subsequent decisions, the Su-
preme Court made an analytical distinction between two different
classes of immunities: (1) the activities of the sovereign state and
its officials, and (2) private parties engaged in anticompetitive con-
duct at the direction of the state. 2
A. Conduct by State Officials
Even though acting within its broad powers, a state agency can
engage in nonexempt activity. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,"3
the plaintiffs alleged that a fee schedule imposed by the Virginia
State Bar and adhered to by the Fairfax County Bar, a private
voluntary association, constituted price-fixing. The Virginia State
Bar, "a state agency by law,"14 is the administrative agency for- im-
9. The board of visitors of the University of Virginia shall be and remain a corporation,
under the style of "the Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia," and shall
have, in addition to its other powers, all the corporate powers given to corporations
by the provisions of Title 13 [Title 13.1]; except in those cases where, by the express
terms of the provisions thereof, it is confined to corporations created under such title;
and shall also have the power to accept, execute and administer any trust in which it
may have an interest under the terms of the instrument creating the trust. The rector
and visitors of the University of Virginia shall be at all times subject to the control of
the General Assembly.
VA. CODE ANN. § 23-69 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
10. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
11. Id. at 352.
12. See Dorman, State Action Immunity: A Problem Under Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 27
CASE W. Ras. L. Rxv. 503 (1977). A distinction has also been drawn between "immunity"
(antitrust liability) and antitrust validity, which "concerns whether the state is permitted to
act as it has acted, even assuming the immunity of the state, its officers, and private par-
ties." Kennedy, Of Lawyers, Lightbulbs, and Raisins: An Analysis of the State Action Doc-
trine Under the Antitrust Laws, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 31, 32 (1979).
13. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
14. Id. at 791.
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plementing the rules and regulations of the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals. To practice law, attorneys must join the Virginia
State Bar.
Rejecting the "status" of the Virginia State Bar as the sole de-
terminant of state action, Chief Justice Burger identified the
"threshold inquiry" in ascertaining exemption as "whether the ac-
tivity is required by the State acting as sovereign." 15 Inquiry was
quickly terminated "because it cannot fairly be said that the State
of Virginia through its Supreme Court rules required the anticom-
petitive activities of either respondent.""6
The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited pur-
poses does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster an-
ticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members .... The
State Bar... has voluntarily joined in what is essentially a private
anticompetitive- activity, and in that position cannot claim it is be-
yond the reach of the Sherman Act.'7
Under Goldfarb, "not every act of a state agency is that of the
State as sovereign."18 When the state agency cannot prove that it
was "compelled" or directly authorized by the state, it acts ultra
vires as a private party.19 Under these principles, the University of
Virginia's priority ticket arrangement would not be protected by
state action.
The University of Virginia is a state institution governed by a
corporate Board of Visitors who are subject to the control of the
Virginia General Assembly.20 By statute, the Board of Visitors has
responsibility for "the care and preservation of all property belong-
ing to the University,"'21 along with the power to regulate the gen-
15. Id. at 790.
16. Id. Burger continued: "It is not enough that ... anticompetitive conduct is
'prompted' by state action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be compelled by direction
of the State acting as a sovereign." Id. at 791.
17. Id. at 792.
18. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978).
19; Dorman, supra note 12, at 509.
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-69 (RepL Vol. 1980).
21. VA. CoDE ANN. § 23-76 (Repl. Vol. 1980) provides:
The board shall be charged with the care and preservation of all property belonging
to the University. They shall appoint a president, with such duties as may be pre-
1980]
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eral affairs of the institution.
This general delegation of authority does not suggest that the
General Assembly intended that the Board of Visitors have license
to impose restraints of trade.22 While the supervision of intercolle-
giate athletics is clearly within the delegation, conduct violating
the federal antitrust laws would presumptively be excluded. In-
deed, such a presumption is made absolute by the General Assem-
bly: in managing the affairs of the University, the Visitors may
"make such regulations as they deem expedient, not being contrary
to law."2 3
A subsequent Supreme Court decision, Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co.,24 presents further obstacles for a state univer-
sity seeking exemption. Plaintiff, a private utility, filed a counter-
claim against a municipality alleging injuries from tie-ins and sham
litigation. Refusing to dismiss the counterclaim, the Court held
that an exemption is permissible only when there exists an articu-
lated state policy to displace competition and the state subdivi-
sions are directed or authorized to engage in anticompetitive con-
duct. Accordingly,. "when the State itself has not directed or
authorized an anticompetitive practice, the State's subdivisions in
exercising their delegated power must obey the antitrust laws."2 5
There is nothing to suggest that the Virginia General Assembly
scribed by the board, and who shall have supreme administrative direction under the
authority of the board over all the schools, colleges and branches of the University
wherever located, and they shall appoint as many professors as they deem proper,
and, with the assent of two thirds of the whole number of visitors, may remove such
president or any professor. They may prescribe the duties of each professor, and the
course and mode of instruction. They may appoint a comptroller and proctor, and
employ any other agents or servants, regulate the government and discipline of the
students, and the renting of the rooms and dormitories, and, generally, in respect to
the government and management of the University, make such regulations as they
may deem expedient, not being contrary to law. To enable the proctor and visitors of
the University to procure a supply of water, and to construct and maintain a system
of waterworks, drainage, and sewerage for the University they shall have power and
authority to acquire such springs, lands and rights-of-way as may be necessary, ac-
cording to the provisions of Title 25.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
25. Id. at 416. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Alum., 100 S. Ct. 937,
943 (1980).
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(or any other state legislature) has enacted or authorized a "com-
prehensive regulatory system" 6 through the creation of the Board
of Visitors with the purpose of regulating intercollegiate athletics.
Nor is there evidence that Virginia and other state legislatures
have "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed"2 7 a policy of
implementing sports restraints of trade. The pronounced absence
of a policy on intercollegiate sports regulation indicates at the least
a neutral attitude by state governments, a state of affairs which
would not justify an exemption from antitrust.2 8
B. Private Party Immunity
Antitrust immunity for the activities of the Virginia Student Aid
Foundation would be tested under Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,29
where the Court set up a four-pronged test. Immunity is achieved
when (1) the defendant's actions are compelled under the author-
ity of a regulation which the state played a dominant role in for-
mulating, (2) the state system is incompatible with the antitrust
laws, (3) immunity is necessary for the successful operation of the
state regulatory system, (4) a balance between the state's interest
in maintaining the regulatory system and federal antitrust policies
weighs in favor of the former.30
The Virginia Student Aid Foundation (VSAF) is a private, non-
profit corporation chartered in 1948 under the Virginia Nonstock
Corporation Act.3 1 Under 1975 Articles of Amendment, it is em-
powered to receive money or property in order to provide loans or
26. 435 U.S. at 410. The Court was referring to Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977),
which exempted a rule prohibiting advertising by lawyers because it was the "affirmative
command of the Arizona Supreme Court" and subject to active supervision and enforcement
by that court.
27. 435 U.S. at 410.
28. Id. at 414-15.
29. 428 U.S. 579 (1976). The plaintiff alleged that Detroit Edison imposed a tying ar-
rangement by furnishing lightbulbs at no extra charge to purchasers of electrical power. The
defendant argued immunity on the basis of an ongoing (since 1916) approval by the Michi-
gan Public Service Commission of tariff rates that included the lightbulb program. Under
existing law, Detroit Edison could not abandon the program without approval by the
Commission. •
30. See Dorman, supra note 12, at 520-21. The Cantor decision has received considerable
criticism. See, e.g., Shenefield & Hartwell, Annual Survey of Antitrust Developments 1975-
76, 34 WAsH. & LEE L. Rlv. 7 (1977).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-204.1 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
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income "to needy young men and women who are seeking an edu-
cation, at the University of Virginia. '3 2 The VSAF also endeavors
to help students obtain employment during vacation periods and
after graduation. To accomplish its objectives, VSAF is permitted
"to appropriate money, property, and other things of value to the
University of Virginia for any general University of Virginia
purpose."33
As a private party who has entered into a joint venture with the
University of Virginia's athletic department to provide services to
contributors and raise funds, VSAF does not satisfy the first prong
under the Cantor test. Other than the general power derived from
the Code of Virginia under the Articles of Incorporation, VSAF re-
ceives no special delegation of authority or direction from the Gen-
eral Assembly. It does not operate within a regulated system whose
purpose is to control competition in intercollegiate athletics, nor
does it answer to a regulatory agency.3 Under these circumstances,
VSAF functions as a private party uncompelled by state action
and thus is not immune to the federal antitrust laws.
III. JURISDICTION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS OVER
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
Before confronting the liability issues, it is necessary to evaluate
the argument that intercollegiate athletics among the "big time"
sports schools are not "trade or commerce" and, therefore, the an-
titrust laws are inapplicable. Defendants may also argue that the
ticket tie-in involves "traditionally non-commercial activity" which
might also exclude coverage.
Under the rubric of "amateurism," college players are popularly
characterized as "student-athletes" whose participation in sports is
primarily a character-building function of the education process.
According to the National Collegiate Athletic Association, the
32. Articles of Amendment, Articles of Incorporation, Virginia Student Aid Foundation
(Dec. 27, 1948) (filed with State Corporation Commission of Virginia).
33. Id.
34. VSAF operates under the supervision of the Athletic Director. Since the athletic de-
partment hardly constitutes a regulatory agency, this is irrelevant to the immunity issue.
Interview with Field Secretary of the Virginia Student Aid Foundation, in Charlottesville,
Va. (June 6, 1980).
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"amateur student-athlete is one who engaged in a particular sport
for the educational, physical, mental, and social benefits he derives
therefrom and to whom participation in that sport is an avoca-
tion. 3 5 By representing the school and performing before the stu-
dents and the public, the team functions as a quasi-educational ap-
paratus similar to a debating team or a law school moot court
team. Hence, according to the accepted wisdom, college sports ac-
tivities are merely a subsidiary element of the general educational
process and do not come within the "trade or commerce"5' 6 juris-
dictional requirements of the antitrust laws or, alternatively, con-
stitute conduct not "traditionally" within the contemplation of the
statute.
The credibility of these arguments depends on a number of fac-
tors, including the degree of the athletic department's autonomy,
the source of revenues, and the level of intercollegiate competition
on which the school participates.
A. Trade or Commerce
1. General Principles
The Supreme Court defines "trade" as "any occupation ... car-
ried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or a livelihood. 37 This
definition has been interpreted liberally to assure the preservation
of competitive markets." Rejecting a plea for a "learned profes-
sion" exemption for lawyers, the Supreme Court continued its sup-
port of this principle by observing that "Congress intended to
strike as broadly as it could in § 1 of the Sherman Act, and to read
into it so wide an exemption as that urged on us would be at odds
35. NCAA CONST. art. 3, § 1, 1980-81 MANUAL, supra note 2, at 9. Sports writer Red
Smith says, "Whenever a college football game is on radio or television, it is accompanied by
edifying words about student athletes, about the importance of intercollegiate athletics in a
rounded educational program and about the vital role played by the National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The edifying words are composed by writers for the N.C.A.A." Smith,
The Student Athlete, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1979, § C, at 3, col. 4.
36. The Sherman Act prohibits restraints of "trade or commerce among the several
states." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
37. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 490 (1950), quoting
The Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506.
38. "If there is a dollar to make, it's trade or commerce." L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF ANTrUST 709 (1977).
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with that purpose. ' ' 9
It is the character of the activity alleged to be in restraint of
trade that determines "trade or commerce." Hence, the fact that
the restraint of trade is performed under the administration of a
"non-profit" academic institution is not dispositive; the "trade or
commerce" requirement is satisfied if the particular activity in-
volved in the alleged restraint has a "commercial motive," such as
profit-making, or is of a "business character."'40 As a sports treatise
summarizes: "[T]he Court's view of the concept of 'business' in
this context seems to be quite broad and may include all undertak-
ings which have significant economic consequences.''41
2. Intercollegiate Athletics as "Trade or Commerce"
The production of major college sports events involves the com-
mitment of substantial financial resources and typically has "sig-
nificant economic consequences." Operating with million-dollar an-
nual budgets, athletic programs at the major football and
basketball powers actively compete for the entertainment dollar.
The ideal is participation in a post-season bowl or tournament,
where the share of gate receipts can go as high as a million dol-
lars.42 The following statistics provide the broad contours of the
large economic commitment:
Intercollegiate athletics are big business. Five years ago, it was es-
timated that intercollegiate athletics consumed "about one percent
of the [$30 billion] budget for higher education in the United
39. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975). See generally Note, The
Antitrust Liability of Professional Associations After Goldfarb: Reformulating the Learned
Professions Exemption in the Lower Courts, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1047.
40. See Note, The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other "Non-
commercial" Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313 (1972) [hereinafter cited as The Applicability of
the Sherman Act].
41. J. WEISTART & C. LOWSLL, supra note 1, at 765. "The general rule appears to be that
every conceivable kind of commercial activity, unless it involves either professional baseball
or a statutorily exempt area, is subject to the Sherman Act, if that activity has the requisite
interstate involvement." 16 Business Organizations, J. VON KALINoWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS
AND TRADE REGULATIONS § 4.02 (1979). Given the intensive interstate travel of major college
teams, the interstate involvement requirement would present no problem.
42. Under a new two-year contract with NBC, the NCAA will receive $18.5 million for
television rights to the NCAA basketball tournaments. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 27, 1979,
at 6.
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States." That came to $300 million or so, at a time when $3 million
was a high sports budget. Today, with the budgets for athletic pro-
grams as some institutions approaching $5 million, the intercollegi-
ate athletic enterprise could be approaching the half-billion dollar
mark.4 3
Due to inexperience in athletic affairs, along with a general lack
of interest and pressures from alumni, administrators at the "big
time" powers separated the educational function from sports en-
tertainment by creating autonomous athletic departments. Speak-
ing on the autonomy of athletic programs, the former president of
Southern Methodist University is quoted as saying: "I didn't real-
ize that there are a tremendous number of schools in this country
where the president or chancellor does not run the athletic pro-
gram. Where it is treated as none of his business by an athletic
board or totally independent athletic director. . . .
"Profit-center" athletic departments are charged with the re-
sponsibility to make enough profits from the major sports to help
subsidize the "minor" sports.'5 One study showed that 68 percent
of all revenues for Division I sports programs are derived from
"gate receipts, guarantees, and conference, bowl, and television in-
come." 4 As a specific example, a federal court noted that the Uni-
versity of Alabama "has an athletic program which involves mil-
lions of dollars annually, and which has over the years, produced
significant 'profits' for use by non-athletic activities of the institu-
tion. ' 47 Complete commercialization was assured when control was
voluntarily surrendered to the NCAA, which has been character-
ized as a "business cartel composed of university-firms which have
varying desires to restrict competition and maximize profits in the
43. Hanford, Controversies in College Sports, 60 EDuc. REc. 351, 359 (1979). See J.
DuRso, THE SPORTS FACTORY (1975).
44. Davis, The President's Role in Athletics: Leader or Figurehead?, 60 EDuc. REc. 420,
426 (1979). A study by the American Council on Education complained of difficulty in ob-
taining data on the finances of intercollegiate athletics because "intercollegiate athletics is
an area of university operations that tends to be shrouded in secrecy." The Chronicle of
Higher Education, June 16, 1980, at 15-16.
45. See Hanford, supra note 43.
46. Lopiano, Solving the Financial Crisis in Intercollegiate Athletics, 60 Enuc. REc. 394,
398 (1979).
47. Hennessey v. NCAA, [1977] 2 Trade Cas. 73,176, 73,179 n.14 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 1977).
1980]
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area of intercollegiate athletics."4
When functioning as autonomous profit-centers, athletic depart-
ments are compelled to attract talented players, hire successful
coaches, and produce winning teams. In this context, players are
employees rather than students.49 The function of athletics has be-
come commercial-to make a profit so as to be self-sustaining. 0
The athletic department "operates as, and indeed is, a commercial
enterprise separate from the rest of the institution, like the food
service or campus union building.""
An allegation of a ticket priority tie-in would include the athletic
department as the seller of sports tickets and a booster club or
organization similar to the VSAF as the seller of certain services.
The sale of tickets and scholarship funding are basic elements in
the production of intercollegiate sports entertainment. As to those
major schools producing sports entertainment, "there is a business
aspect in the providing of ... athletic events to an interested pub-
48. Koch, A Troubled Cartel: The NCAA, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 135 (1973).
49. For a scathing indictment of the student-athlete myth, see Underwood, The Writing
Is on the Wall, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 19, 1980, at 36.
50. For the major powers, the public relations value of winning teams compels continued
commercialization of the athletic program.
College presidents and administrators increasingly viewed themselves as managers
of multimillion dollar businesses. Publicly favored athletics programs were valuable
assets, providing political, economic, and social support. In return for entertainment,
identification, and the opportunity to be a part of a "winner," the public "adopted"
the institution. In this way, intercollegiate athletics became the university's most vi-
tal public relations vehicle, the visible and well-traversed bridge between the ivory
tower and the state.
Institutional administrators forgot that the public, having made a financial and
moral commitment to real or adopted alma maters, would evaluate its investment by
commercial rather than educational standards. Winning became paramount. With
commercial standards applied, it was inevitable that commercial attitudes would
prevail.
The question became, Could the institution control the delicate balance between
societal, institutional, and student expectations, between commercial and educational
behavior in athletics programs? It could not or would not: no balance was ever
achieved. In fact, commercial behavior has progressively intensified primarily because
of television coverage.
Grant, Institutional Autonomy and Intercollegiate Athletics, 60 Enuc. REc. 409, 411-12
(1979).
51. Hanford, supra note 43, at 364. See Hennessey v. NCAA, [1977] 2 Trade Cas. 73,176,
73,180 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 1977).
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lic"'52 and the ticket tie-in would constitute "trade or commerce. 5 3
B. "Traditionally Non-Commercial" Activity
The corollary argument that college athletics are "traditionally
non-commercial"" is based on the assumption that it was the leg-
islative intent to apply the Sherman Act only to "combinations
having commercial objectives and.., only to a very limited extent
to organizations . . . which normally have other objectives." 55
Courts have not been receptive to this argument, accepting it only
in those situations where the underlying motivation behind the
conduct is social or political .5  Neither characterization applies
when schools give first priority to the production of major athletic
shows with a profit motive.
57
IV. THE ELEMENTS OF AN ILLEGAL TYING ARRANGEMENT
A tying arrangement exists whenever one product is sold on the
condition that the purchaser also buy a second product.58 Plaintiff
must first prove the existence of a tying arrangement. To prove
illegality, plaintiff must satisfy the per se liability requirements
that the tying product possess "sufficient economic power" and
52. Id. at 73,180.
53. A comment attributed to the school's president suggests that the "profit-center" con-
cept is followed. Responding to student protest over a $20 increase in athletic fees, "Presi-
dent Hereford pointed out that the athletic department is entirely self-supporting. 'It must
generate revenues not only for operating costs but for the maintenance and repair of its
buildings and facilities."' UNIVERSrrY OF VIRGINIA ALUMNI NEWS, May-June 1979, at 13.
Sports Illustrated reports that University of Virginia officials decided to "increase athletic
expenditures from $2.7 million to $4.4 million by 1983-84." Deford, It's V-I-R-G-I-N-I-A-A-
A-A, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 15, 1980, at 64, 76.
54. See The Applicability of the Sherman Act, supra note 40.
55. Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secon-
dary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
56. See Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REV.
705 (1962).
57. In response to an "educational exemption" argument, the Fifth Circuit said:
Nor should it be taken as any attack upon the amateurism of intercollegiate athletics
for one to acknowledge that there is a business aspect in the providing of coaching for
the athletes or in the providing of athletic events to an interested public. The court
holds that the NCAA is not entitled to a total exclusion from antitrust regulations on
this ground.
Hennessey v. NCAA, [1977] 2 Trade Cas. 73,176, 73,180 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 1977).
58. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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that a not insubstantial amount of commerce in the tied product
be involved. 9 The existence of a tie-in is established by proof that
separate and distinct tying and tied products are involved and that
the tying product is sold or leased on the condition that a tied
product also be purchased or leased.60 Since the latter issue is eas-
ily resolved, it will be discussed first.
A. "Sale on Condition"
Satisfactory proof that the sale of one product occurred "on con-
dition" that a second item be purchased can be derived from an
express agreement or inferred from the circumstances surrounding
the relationship between the seller and buyer.6 1 Ticket priority
plans like Virginia's impose express tying terms on season basket-
ball ticket purchasers. Through VSAF literature, the terms of the
"sale on condition" are described: "Availability of tickets and
parking are determined by the amount of contribution in the cur-
rent year [to the VSAF], the total monies contributed to the VSAF
and the continuous years of VSAF membership.16 2 Although the
terms of the tie-in are specific, the final consequences are not.
Since there are a finite number of available seats and a variety of
factors determining priority, purchasers do not know if they have
successfully obtained a ticket until all subscriptions have been cal-
59. Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires proof of both per se elements, while § 3 of the
Clayton Act is satisfied by proof of either element. A plaintiff who fails to satisfy the per se
standards may attempt to prove liability under the "rule of reason." Fortner Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 499 (1969). The difference in standards is
relevant to the ticket priority tie-in under analysis because § 3 of the Clayton Act, unlike § 1
of the Sherman Act, applies only to commodities, not to services. Since the tied product,
membership in VSAF, is composed of a cluster of services, the plaintiff would have to satisfy
the per se standards of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
60. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976), prohibits a lease, sale, or contract
"on the condition, agreement, or understanding" that the lessee or buyer not use or deal in
the commodities of a competitor of the lessor or seller. In an action under § 1 of the Sher-
man Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), the Supreme Court defined the tying arrangement as "an
agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also
purchases a different . . .product." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1958).
61. See Austin, The Individual Coercion Doctrine in Tie-In Analysis: Confusing and Ir-
relevant, 65 CAL. L. REv. 1143 (1977).
62. Virginia Student Aid Foundation: VSAF Priority System (brochure available from
Virginia Student Aid Foundation). See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
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culated according to the priority rules.6 3
B. Separate Products
Since adverse effects can be presumed only when market power
over the tying product is used to exert power over a second or
"tied" product, the plaintiff must prove that two separate products
are involved in the sale. The inexhaustible and diverse range of
possible product relationships renders determination of this issue
more an exercise in practical judgment than in legal or economic
analysis." Courts generally adopt a functional approach, focusing
on such factors as custom, product interchangeability, and buyer
perceptions. 5
Viewed functionally, the Virginia type of ticket priority tie-in in-
volves the tying of membership in the VSAF to a season basketball
ticket. As the tied item, VSAF membership is composed of a clus-
ter of services, including "dinners, socials and visits from Wahoo
coaches," receipt of various sports publications, and parking prior-
ity.6 More significantly, membership provides a form of "status"
that gives the subscriber an opportunity to build up a reserve of
priority points.8
There are two arguments that can be raised in opposition to a
separability interpretation. One is that required membership in the'
VSAF is merely an "ancillary service" that normally occurs in the
sale and distribution of season tickets.8 It is, therefore, no more
63. Directions for ascertaining priority are established by the VSAF Board of Trustees.
Interview with Field Secretary of the Virginia Student Aid Foundation, in Charlottesville,
Va. (June 6, 1980).
64. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 38, at 443.
65. See generally Ross, The Single Product Issue in Antitrust Tying: A Functional Ap-
proach, 23 EMORY L. J. 963 (1974); Wheeler, Some Observations on Tie-ins, the Single-
Product Defense, Exclusive Dealing and Regulated Industries, 60 CAL. L. REv. 1557 (1972).
66. VSAF: There's a VSAF District Near You (brochure available from the Virginia Stu-
dent Aid Foundation). The brochure notes that there are non-material benefits. "There is
the personal satisfaction of belonging to a worthwhile organization, participating in a project
that is succeeding, and finally of helping young people attend the University of Virginia."
Id.
67. Under the VSAF system, two points are awarded for each year of continuous VSAF
membership, with a maximum of twenty points allowable. VSAF Priority System (informa-
tion printed on Virginia Student Aid Foundation pledge card).
68. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 525 (1969) (For-
tas, J., dissenting).
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the sale of two products than is the sale of an automobile and the
transportation for its delivery. 9
The second argument concedes that while the products may, in
fact, be separate, there are "legitimate business reasons" for the
package sale. Although sometimes analyzed as a separate product
problem, this argument constitutes a defense, and will subse-
quently be discussed accordingly.
The underlying rationale of the ancillary service interpretation is
that the seller is providing one of the customary and standard ac-
cessories to the distribution and sale of the tying product. "Almost
all modern selling involves providing some ancillary services in
connection with making the sale. . . . ,,7 Viewed in the broad con-
text of its relevance to the main product, it becomes "incidental"
as a customary accessory.
Analysis of the details of the ticket tying arrangement imposed
under Virginia's priority point system tends to refute this interpre-
tation. The production of the games that constitute the tying prod-
uct is made at the University's home arena, and involves a series of
events-such as scheduling dates, time, or identity of oppo-
nents-which are performed without the immediate involvement
of the VSAF. Other than determining priority status and arranging
for preferred parking, the VSAF does not participate in mainte-
nance of the arena or perform other ancillary services necessary to
produce games. The separateness of the tying and tied products is
further emphasized by the fact that the basketball games are pro-
duced by the Department of Intercollegiate Athletics, while the
69. Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 235 F. Supp. 751, 755 (E.D. Ky. 1962), af['d,
338 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 954 (1965). The court of appeals held
Chrysler not liable because it used independent common carriers to transport its cars to
dealers and received no economic benefit. See notes 109-18 infra and accompanying text.
70. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 525 (1969) (For-
tas, J., dissenting). Justice Fortas stated further:
Customarily-indeed almost invariably-the seller offers these ancillary services
only in connection with the sale of his own products, and they are often offered with-
out cost or at bargain rates. It is possible that in some situations, such arrangements
could be used to restrain competiton or might have that effect, but to condemn them
out-of-hand under the "tying" rubric, is, I suggest, to use the antitrust laws them-
selves as an instrument in restraint of competition.
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VSAF is an independent nonprofit foundation.7 1 The "separation"
of the production of the tying product is discerned in the ability of
the VSAF to convey its cluster of services throughout the year at
various geographic locations, while staging home basketball games
is restricted as to time and location. Finally, many other major col-
lege sports enterprises do not find it necessary to use a VSAF
method to produce games successfully. 2
C. Proof of Liability
1. Per Se Liability
Because of "their pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue, '7 8 the Supreme Court has held that tying
arrangements are per se illegal. Liability is established by proof
that the seller has "sufficient economic power" over the tying prod-
uct to restrain competition appreciably, and that a "not insubstan-
tial amount of commerce in the tied product is affected.""4 Under
the per se doctrine, satisfactory proof of these two elements con-
clusively establishes liability, thereby precluding the defendant
from presenting evidence justifying its conduct.75
Plaintiffs have successfully met the burden of proving sufficient
economic power over the tying product by reference to certain "in-
dicia." Proof of the existence of a "host of tying arrangements, '7 6
the presence of the "burdensome terms" of a tying arrangement,
and the "uniqueness '7 8 of the tying product have been accepted by
courts as "indicia." In United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter-
71. This may be more ostensible than real since the athletic director exercises authority
over some VSAF conduct. Moreover, all scholarship grants from the VSAF "must be ap-
proved by the University's Committee on Scholarships, Loans, and Employment, the com-
mittee which administers all scholarships and grants awarded by the University of Vir-
ginia." VSAF: How It Operates (brochure available from Virginia Student Aid Foundation).
72. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
73. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
74. See note 59 supra.
75. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969). However,
lower courts have ignored the per se rule to allow evidence of justifications or defenses. See
notes 93-95 infra and accompanying text.
76. 356 U.S. at 8.
77. 394 U.S. at 504.
78. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962). See generally C. HILLS, AmI-
TRUST ADvisOR 93-103 (rev. ed. 1978).
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prises, Inc. (Fortner II),11 the Supreme Court emphasized the im-
portance of evidence demonstrating that the seller enjoys a cost
advantage over rivals in producing the tying product.8 0
As a predicate to proving defendant's sufficient economic power
over the tying product, the plaintiff must identify the product
market in which the seller competes. Since a per se violation is
involved, it is unnecessary for the plaintiff "to embark upon a full-
scale factual inquiry into the scope of the relevant market for the
tying product."8 " Nonetheless, since the product configuration in-
volved in the Virginia type of ticket priority tie-in has not received
prior judicial examination, a brief delineation of product and geo-
graphic markets is advisable. In the process, the type of evidence
bearing on proving "sufficient economic power" will be examined.
Determination of the tying product's market power requires con-
sideration of the competition from substitute products. It is also
necessary to determine the relevant geographic market, which is
defined as that area in which the seller does business and the buy-
ers can exercise buying power consistent with their economic
capacities.82
The University of Virginia basketball team competes in the
NCAA Division I intercollegiate market.83 As a submarket of the
entire college sports entertainment market, this product market is
characterized by unique rules, strategy, and fan support.8 Division
I basketball is therefore distinguishable from professional basket-
ball or any other form of sports entertainment where seasons may
overlap. Within this general product market Virginia competes in
the Atlantic Coast Conference (A.C.C.), which is nationally known
79. 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
80. Id. at 620-22. It is possible to read Justice Stevens' opinion as imposing a more strin-
gent "sufficient economic power" standard. See Jones, The Two Faces of Fortner: Comment
on a Recent Antitrust Opinion, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 39 (1978).
81. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 n.4 (1962).
82. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961).
83. See note 2 supra.
84. The "submarket" principle is derived from Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962), where the Supreme Court indicated that submarkets are to be defined by "prac-
tical indicia" such as "industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate eco-
nomic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities,
distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors." Id.
at 325.
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for outstanding teams, vociferous fans, and talented performers,
along with innovative floor tactics such as the "four corners of-
fense." The caliber of play and the intense rivalries that have blos-
somed make each game a significant event.85 Since the University
of Virginia is the only A.C.C. member from Virginia, its home
games provide a unique product to fans within traveling distance.
The product and geographical uniqueness of the University of Vir-
ginia's home games is further enhanced by the location of the Uni-
versity in a region without serious competition from professional
teams or other college teams that play on the A.C.C. level. Virginia
Tech, the nearest team with a national reputation, is located in
southwest Virginia, approximately 150 miles from Charlottesville.
In addition, no other team in the area can showcase the talents of
Ralph Sampson, "acclaimed as the next great center, a second
coming of Russell, Chamberlain, or Abdul-Jabbar."8 6 Winning the
1980 National Invitational Tournament and the attendant public-
ity added another layer of "uniqueness" to the production of home
games.
Within this clearly defined product and geographic area, Univer-
sity of Virginia home basketball games assume the characteristics
of a monopoly product, easily supplying the seller with "sufficient
economic power" over the tying product. Indeed, the uniqueness of
the home games justifies comparison to copyrighted films87 or
trademarks,88 which have been recognized as conclusive indicia of
"sufficient market power." As a producer of intercollegiate basket-
ball games, the University of Virginia has the power to control
prices. 19
The second liability requirement-a "not insubstantial" amount
of commerce affected in the tied product-is determined according
to dollar amount and, according to Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States Steel Corp. (Fortner I), can be as low as $190,000.90
85. The ACC basketball phenomenon has been recognized by the national media. See,
e.g., "In The South, There's No Doubt A.C.C. Tourney Is The Greatest," N.Y. Times, Mar.
2, 1980, § 5, at 11, col. 4.
86. The Sporting News, Dec. 22, 1979, at 34.
87. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
88. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
89. United States v. E.L duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956).
90. 394 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1969).
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According to tax returns, VSAF received "gross contributions,
gifts, grants and similar amounts" of $1,021,650 and $1,222,930 for
the years 1977-78 and 1978-79.91 The bulk of "contributions" are
payments for priority points and access to other benefits and ser-
vices, and are substantial enough to satisfy easily the Fortner I
standard.
The Supreme Court's experience with tie-ins has crystallized
into an unyielding per se condemnation.92 Under Supreme Court
decisions, proof that the University of Virginia season basketball
tickets are sufficiently "unique" to deposit the seller with monop-
oly power and that a non-insubstantial amount of commerce in
VSAF membership is affected would render the tying restraint per
se illegal, cutting off defenses or justifications.
2. Justifications and Defenses
Confronted with an inexhaustible variety of tie-in configurations,
lower federal courts have occasionally refused to apply the per se
rule. As one court rationalized, "while the per se rule should be
followed in almost all cases, the court must always be conscious of
the fact that a case might arise in which the facts indicate that an
injustice would be done by blindly accepting the per se rule."93
Enough courts have followed this rationalization to produce a sub-
stantial number of decisions allowing defendants an opportunity to
offer evidence justifying the use of tie-ins.94 Moreover, in manifest-
ing tolerance for certain types of ties, lower courts sometimes ex-
pand inquiry to include an examination of possible effects on
competition. 5
a. Legitimate Business Reasons
Rationalizing that there are "legitimate reasons for selling nor-
91. Tax returns filed on form 990 under I.R.C. § 501(e) (returns available at Internal
Revenue Service, Mid-Atlantic Regional Office).
92. Fortner II may have increased the burden of proof necessary to satisfy the "sufficient
economic power" requirement. See note 80 supra.
93. United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
94. See Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some New Thoughts, 1967 Wis.
L. Rev. 88, 113-23.
95. See the professional football ticket cases, notes 120-36 infra and accompanying text.
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mally separate items in a combined form," courts have allowed
ties to protect goodwill, to assure the tying products' quality,98
and to enable a newcomer to enter a market when malfunctions
would deter investment.99 In these special situations courts weigh
the likelihood of creating a more efficient firm against the possibil-
ity of harmful effects on competition. The "crucial question" is
whether the defendant "could have accomplished the ends it
sought without requiring the [tying] contracts." 100
Since the University of Virginia is a long-standing member of
the NCAA and A.C.C., a conference known for success in the pro-
duction of basketball entertainment, 101 the newcomer defense obvi-
ously does not apply.10 2 The two other "legitimate reason" de-
fenses-protection of quality and goodwill-require that the
defendant meet the burden of proving that the tying arrangement
is the least harmful alternative and that without the use of the tie-
in the integrity of the product would suffer irreparable harm. 03
In all probability, major sports schools like the University of Vir-
96. 187 F. Supp. at 559. In Jerrold, the government alleged two ties: (1) Jerrold required
purchasers of antennae to accept service contracts for supervision on installation and main-
tenance and (2) Jerrold refused to "sell its various items of equipment designed for commu-
nity antenna systems separately, but [agreed] only to sell them as components of a complete
system." Id. at 558. Judge Van Dusen exonerated the tirst fie under the "newcomer" ration-
ale and held that there was a "sound business reason" for the second tie. "Thus, the court
concludes that Jerrold's policy of full system sales was a necessary adjunct to its policy of
compulsory service and was reasonably regarded as a product as long as the conditions
which dictated the use of the service contract continued to exist." Id. at 560.
97. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 80 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1935).
98. United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Susser v. Car-
vel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
99. United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960). See also Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962).
100. 187 F. Supp. at 557.
101. In 1980, six member schools (Maryland, North Carolina, North Carolina State, Duke,
Clemson, and Virginia) participated in post-season tournaments.
102. In Jerrold, the court made it clear that the tie-in contracts were not protected once
Jerrold became an established enterprise. "[W]hile Jerrold has satisfied this court that its
policy was reasonable at its inception, it has failed to satisfy us that it remained reasonable
throughout the period of its use, even allowing it a reasonable time to recognize and adjust
its policies to changing conditions." 187 F. Supp. at 558.
103. Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrig. Corp., 463 F.2d 1002, 1016 (5th Cir.
1972); United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 557 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Austin,
supra note 94, at 113-16.
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ginia would have difficulty in satisfying this burden. Many schools
conduct highly successful athletic programs without resorting to
ticket priority tie-ins,10' a fact that persuasively suggests the avail-
ability of less harmful alternatives. Most importantly, there is
nothing to indicate that a ticket priority tie-in is an essential factor
in the successful production of basketball or football entertain-
ment. While forced membership in the VSAF may provide the
scholarship funds for paying the wages of the athlete-employees,0 5
these funds are fungible and could just as easily be appropriated
from some other source in the budget. Moreover, since the NCAA
defines the terms of employment between its members and the
athlete-employees, 06 the success of recruiting depends on other
factors, such as the school's athletic record, climate, and the oppor-
tunity to play immediately and before a national television audi-
ence."'7 The tenacity of the recruiters, along with the reputation
and personality of the head coach, are also important intangibles
in successful recruiting.'08
b. The Split-Ownership Defense
Where, like the University of Virginia and VSAF, the sellers of
the tying and tied products are separate and distinct corporations,
the "split-ownership" defense may be applicable. Section 3 of the
Clayton Act prohibits a seller from using a tying arrangement to
prevent buyers from dealing with "a competitor or competitors of
104. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
105. For the year 1978-79, VSAF contributed $680,995 to the University of Virginia for
"grants in aid to student athletes." VSAF also supplied $332,855 for "stadium expansion."
Tax returns, supra note 91.
106. For a discussion of the NCAA as a cartel, see Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athlet-
ics: An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L. J. 655 (1978); Koch, supra note 48.
107. "Lots of kids being recruited don't ask for much extra if you can promise them six to
eight appearances in three years before a U.S. television audience. The publicity, what it
means to their ambitions to turn pro, is enough to sell them." J. MICHNER, SPORTS IN
AMERICA 399 (1976).
108. The intangibles of the recruiting battle are endless, including coed escorts. The Uni-
versity of North Carolina relies on "The Sweet Carolines," described as "40 of the prettiest
coeds at UNC. Their job (for which they volunteer and are selected and receive no money)
is to greet the prospects, show them around campus, make them feel at home and, in gen-
eral, try to sell them on attending Carolina." Cleveland Press, Thurs., Nov. 15, 1979, § C, at
1, col. 3. For an expose of the darker side of college recruiting, see K. DENLINGER & L.
SHAPIRO, ATHLETES FOR SALE (1975); J. ROONEY, THE RECRUITING GAME (1980).
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the . . . seller." 109 Moreover, "the conventional case law definition
of the tying arrangement assumes a single seller using the market
power of one product as a means of inducing the purchaser to buy
a second product."110 Hence the argument that there is no viola-
tion when the alleged tyer-for example, the University of Vir-
ginia-does not compete in the market for the tied product- here
furnishing a cluster of services to season ticket holders.
This interpretation has been criticized for "exalting form over
substance"1 and for ignoring the adverse effects of the tie-in on
the buyers.11 2 Moreover, while section 3 of the Clayton Act was
specifically enacted to reach tie-ins and exclusive dealing,113 sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act, which is the applicable statute where
services are involved,114 is a general purpose statute reaching
agreements to restrain trade. The "contract, conspiracy, or combi-
nation" between the school and the VSAF form of organization to
tie season tickets to membership satisfies the broad statutory
range of the Sherman Act. According to one court:
In such cases, if the tying agreement itself is found to be unlawful,
then both the seller of the tying product (who is a party to the tying
agreement) and the seller of the tied product (who is not a party to
the tying agreement itself) may be held liable as members of a con-
spiracy to restrain trade by means of the tying agreement....
And in such cases, it is plain that the defendant, who sells the tied
product, but who is not a party to the tying contract itself, commits
overt acts in futherance of the conspiracy whenever he collects pay-
ment for the tied product from plaintiff.115
Most significantly, the recent trend of the decisions avoids statu-
tory nitpicking when the tier receives a pecuniary benefit from the
sale of the tied product.106 In Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co.," 7
109. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
110. Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 95 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
111. Ross, The Single Product Issue in Antitrust Tying: A Functional Approach, 23 EM-
oRY L. J. 963, 988 (1974).
112. 68 F.R.D. at 95-96.
113. REPORT OF THE ATTY. GEN'L'S NAT. COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTrrRusT LAws 137 (1955).
114. See note 59 supra.
115. Imperial Point Colonnades Condominium, Inc. v. Mangurian, 549 F.2d 1029, 1043
(5th Cir. 1977).
116. Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc., [1980] 1 Trade Cas. 77,414 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1979);
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the Fourth Circuit held a split-ownership tie-in illegal, noting,
The perniciousness of the imposed tie-in is aggravated by the fact
that the defendant is not even in the business of selling the tied
products, but is employing its economic power in the gasoline indus-
try to force his dealers to do business with a supplier in another
industry under an arrangement that yields the defendant an extra-
neous revenue.
118
The University of Virginia derives substantial pecuniary benefits
from its relationship with the VSAF. At the least, VSAF assumes
the responsibility for allocating season tickets. By arranging social
functions involving coaches and ticket holders and circulating
sports publications, VSAF assumes a publicity agent role. How-
ever, the most significant economic benefit comes from access to
VSAF scholarship funds, which relieves Virginia of a costly
financial burden.'19
V. THE FOOTBALL TICKET TIE-IN CASES
Lower courts have eschewed application of the per se rule in
cases involving allegations of illegal ticket tying arrangements by
National Football League professional football teams.120 These
cases are particularly relevant because of the liability rationale
adopted by several decisions and the acceptance of defenses in fact
situations somewhat similar to the ticket priority tie-ins analyzed
in this article.
Plaintiffs' common allegation was that an NFL team imposed a
tie-in by forcing purchasers of season tickets to buy one or more
Suburban Mobile Homes, Inc. v. AMFAC Communities, [1980] 1 Trade Cas. 77,163 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 30, 1980).
117. 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960).
118. 286 F.2d at 839. The court continued: "The defendant in this case goes a step further
than the supplier in the usual tie-in case, for here the tied product is not even handled or
sold by the defendant, but it farms out to another, for a price, its coercive economic power."
Id. at 840.
119. See note 91 supra.
120. Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., 498 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1974); Coniglio
v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974); Pfeiffer v. New England Patriots
Football Club, Inc., [1973] 1 Trade Cas. 93,265 (1st Cir. Nov. 1, 1972); Laing v. Minnesota
Vikings Football Club, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 59 (D. Minn. 1973); Grossman Dev. Co. v. Detroit
Lions, Inc., [1973] 2 Trade Cas. 95,538 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 1973).
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tickets to pre-season games. Pre-season games were allegedly of in-
ferior quality, highly undesirable, and would not have been pur-
chased absent the tie-in. In rejecting plaintiffs' allegations and
granting defendants' motions for summary judgment, the courts
relied upon one or more of the following rationales: (1) season and
pre-season games are fungible and thus constitute a "single prod-
uct," (2) plaintiffs failed to prove "sufficient economic power" over
the tying product to "coerce" acceptance of the tied item, and (3)
failure of plaintiffs to demonstrate the existence of harmful effects
on competition in the market for the tied product. Each of these
arguments will be evaluated for its relevance to the University of
Virginia type of ticket priority tie-in.
A. Description and Analysis of the Cases
1. Single Product
One court resolved the issue favorably for the defendant by con-
struing the transaction as involving only one product. To Judge
Garrity, professional football is professional football and any dis-
tinction between season and pre-season games "would rest on such
gassamer and subjective considerations as to be untenable. ' 121 This
is the weakest of the three exculpatory rationales employed in the
pro football tie-in cases. Its most obvious flaw is that it ignores the
critical difference in relevance to league standings of season and
pre-season games. 122 As a consequence, the holding is in direct con-
flict with those decisions which recognize separability on the basis
of product quality differences. 23 Even if one conceded credibility
to the single product argument in pro football tie-ins, it is not rele-
vant to the University of Virginia tie-in model. There is no quality
continuum connecting the VSAF cluster of services with the pro-
121. Pfeiffer v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., [1973] 1 Trade Cas. 93,265 (1st
Cir. Nov. 1, 1972). The court added: "For example, how could a court determine objectively
whether a regular season game with the Philadelphia Eagles is a more interesting and desir-
able product than a pre-season game against the Dallas Cowboys? We consider such deter-
minations to be out of our league." Id.
122. Several courts have held that product separability was a triable issue of fact. See
Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., 498 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1974); Coniglio v.
Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974); Grossman Dev. Co. v. Detroit Lions,
Inc., [1973] 2 Trade Cas. 95,538 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 1973).
123. Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286, 1291 (2d Cir. 1974).
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duction of home basketball games that justifies a finding that the
items are "fungible.112 4 As discussed earlier, the tying and tied ser-
vices are produced by different entities charged with different re-
sponsibilities and operating from separate sources of corporate
authority. 125
2. Sufficient Economic Power to Coerce
All of the pro football ticket tie-in cases either expressly or im-
plicitly indicate that plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating
"sufficient economic power in the tying market to coerce purchase
of the tied product. ' 126 In two decisions, defendants' motions for
summary judgment were granted when the record showed the
availability of a sufficient number of single game tickets. 127 As one
court explained, "[w]hile individual game tickets remain available,
it cannot be said that defendant has structured the marketing of
its tickets in such a way that consumers are compelled to buy
something they don't want in order to obtain something they do
want.' 128
This interpretation of the requisites for per se liability exagger-
ates the plaintiff's burden of proof in showing "sufficient economic
power" over the tying product.1 29 It is, of course, true that if the
seller has no market power over the tying product, the presence of
tie-ins would be of little or no competitive consequence. This is
hardly the case in pro football, where each franchise is a monopoly.
Within its franchise geographic market, each NFL team exer-
cises monopoly price power over season, single, and pre-season
tickets. As soon as a professional team imposes the season-pre-sea-
124. The "fungibility" doctrine was established in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). Lower courts have not embraced the Times-Picayune
test: "The Times Picayune case has been limited to the exact set of facts before the
court .... "American Mfrs. Mutual Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Thea-
tres, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 848, 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
125. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
126. Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., 498 F.2d 321, 323 (5th Cir. 1974).
127. Pfeiffer v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., [1973] 1 Trade Cas. 93,265 (1st
Cir. Nov. 1, 1972); Laing v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 59 (D.
Minn. 1973).
128. Laing v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 59, 60 (D. Minn. 1973).
129. See notes 76-80 supra and accompanying text.
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son ticket tie-in, some buyers (those who desire assured season-
long access to regular games and preferred seating) lose the oppor-
tunity to obtain an unencumbered season ticket. The presence of
sufficient economic power is therefore manifest: "Such appreciable
restraint results whenever the seller can exert some power over
some of the buyers in the market, even if his power is not complete
over them and over all other buyers in the market." 130
The pro football "sufficient economic power" holdings are inap-
plicable to the University of Virginia-VSAF type of tie-in. As pre-
viously discussed, the absence of substitute sports entertainment,
the unique style of A.C.C. competition, and the presence of out-
standing talent on the University of Virginia's team creates mo-
nopoly power over season tickets. s The utilization of this market
power is manifested in the presence of the tie-ins and the alloca-
tion of student season ticket space. Of the available 9,000 home
game tickets, 4,500 are allocated to students, while the remaining
4,500 are sold to season ticket holders,"3 2 presumably under VSAF
tie-in terms.
3. Lack of Adverse Effects in the Market for the Tied Product
In Coniglio v. Highwood Services, Inc.,1 33 defendants argued
that since they held an NFL franchise monopoly in both season
and pre-season football games, the tying arrangements could not
produce anti-competitive effects in the market for the tied prod-
uct. The Second Circuit agreed, concluding that "Highwood is not
using its economic power in the tying (season ticket) market to 're-
strain free competition in the market for the tied product.' "'
The court also rejected plaintiff's effort to create a "general en-
tertainment market" of alternative activities into which pre-season
games could be included. Plaintiff relied on this argument to show
that the tie-in would adversely affect rival producers of "general
entertainment." 1 5
130. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969).
131. See notes 83-89 supra and accompanying text.
132. Information obtained from Sports Information Office, University Hall, University of
Virginia.
133. 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974).
134. Id. at 1291, quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
135. In rejecting this contention, the court said: "[W]e consider the purportedly relevant
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The plaintiff's second argument that the tie-in forced the abdi-
cation of his "freedom" to evaluate and select the tied product on
o its merits was rejected. To the court, the coerced restraint on the
buyer's freedom of choice "represents no more than the causal de-
terminant of the proscribed restraint on competition in the tied
market which ordinarily results from such interference."' 3
It could be argued that Coniglio exonerates the University of
Virginia ticket priority tie-in. Similar to the pro football context,
the University of Virginia exercises a monopoly over home basket-
ball games while VSAF is the sole supplier of the tied services.
With no competition in the market for VSAF services, the ticket
tie cannot produce adverse effects in that market. However, the
credibility of Coniglio weakens, perhaps fatally, when the court's
rationale is examined.
a. Criticisms
A threshold criticism of the Second Circuit's perception of the
tie-in is that it ignores the firmly established Supreme Court pre-
cedent which assumes that the restraint invariably produces harm-
ful effects and is therefore per se illegal.13 7 Recognizing the drastic
consequences of a conclusive liability doctrine,'3" the Supreme
Court has been cautious in characterizing restraints of trade as per
se illegal. Once the issue is settled, however, the Court is not in-
clined to accept qualifications. "In applying these rigid rules, the
Court has consistently rejected the notion that naked restraints of
trade are to be tolerated because they are well intended or because
they are allegedly developed to increase competition."'' 39 Given this
well established policy, lower courts should ignore the per se rule
product market so broadly defined as to render that concept all but meaningless as an ana-
lytic tool for assessing the anti-competitive effect requisite to a Sherman Act violation." Id.
at 1292.
136. Id. at 1293.
137. See note 73 supra.
138. The drastic effects of the per se rule have been sharply criticized as "repugnant to
• ..constitutional safeguards." Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a
Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139, 1157 (1952). It "forecloses a
respondent from introducing evidence on the panoply of possible legal and economic justifi-
cations in harmony with an overriding public interest of which the antitrust laws may prop-
erly take cognizance." Id. at 1157-58.
139. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
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only in those rare instances where "the facts indicate that an injus-
tice would be done by blindly accepting the per se rule. '140
It is difficult to perceive an "injustice" in applying the per se
rule to pro football tie-ins. The decisions offer no facts that would
support recognition of any of the accepted justifications such as
newcomer, quality control, and goodwill. 14 1 Moreover, subsequent
analysis reveals the likelihood that the purpose behind the re-
straint is to exploit market leverage so as to maximize monopoly
profits, an objective hardly justifying nonadherence to entrenched
policy.
Even assuming the appropriateness of discarding per se charac-
terization, the "rule of reason" analysis adopted by the court mis-
interprets or fails to recognize the reasons that prompted the Su-
preme Court to include tie-ins under the per se characterization.4 2
Specifically, the pro football ticket opinions fail to perceive the
various ways that tie-ins can produce harmful effects.
In its initial encounters with tying arrangements, the Supreme
Court identified the "leverage" effect as the principal vice. By
transferring monopoly power from the tying product, the seller can
use the tying arrangement to increase its market power in the tied
product. In a 1917 case, for example, the Court concluded that ty-
ing films to patented exhibiting machines could "create a monop-
oly in the manufacture and use of moving picture films, wholly
outside of the patent in suit and of the patent law.
143
Subsequently, in IBM Corp. v. United States14 4 and Interna-
tional Salt Co. v. United States,145 the Supreme Court expressed
disapproval of a different manifestation of "leverage"-the use of
140. United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556 (E.D. Pa. 1960). See Van
Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1173 (1964).
141. See notes 96-100 supra.
142. Under the "rule of reason," courts balance the effects on competition against justifi-
cations. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
143. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917).
Economic literature discounts the prevalence of monopoly extension tie-ins, acknowledging
this effect only when the seller ties products that are not used in fixed proportions with the
tying product. See, e.g., Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE
L.J. 19, 25-26 (1957).
144. 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
145. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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the tie-in to maximize monopoly revenues. By resorting to a tie-in,
a seller can utilize existing market power in a more efficient man-
ner-"in a way that increases the net return from the exercise of
that power.1 146 The Court's assumptions on this form of "leverage"
are implicit and do not specifically identify the various ways in
which revenue maximizing can occur. A more thorough description
of this form of leverage has been presented by economists, who
note that tie-ins can maximize revenues by: (1) producing econo-
mies in production or distribution of goods, (2) protecting goodwill,
(3) sharing risks with buyers, (4) evading price ceilings on the tying
product, and (5) price discrimination. 147
The mainspring of "leverage" exploitation by the seller is the
existence of monopoly power over the tying product. Absent mo-
nopolistic control, enough buyers would be able to go to other
sources so as to render the tie-in ineffective. 148 As a result, the ba-
sis for liability under early Supreme Court decisions was proof of
enough monopoly power to produce either of the two possible lev-
erage effects. 49 The liability test was subsequently reduced to its
present per se formulation when the Court recognized two addi-
146. Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAW &
CONTEmP. PROB. 522 (1965). Sullivan describes International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392 (1947) and the revenue-maximizing effects:
On our assumption, the tie of salt to the salt dispensing machine has no distorting
effect on the salt market-the dispensing machine monopolist gains no new power
there-but given the fact that buyers must fill all salt needs from the seller (though
no salt quantities are specified), it does enable the machine monopolist to increase its
monopoly return: through the tie the monopolist can, in effect, extract a higher price
for its monoploy.
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 38, at 446. See Bowman, supra note 143; Burstein, A Theory of
Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U. L. Rav. 62 (1960); Director & Levi, Law and the Future:
Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 281 (1956); Posner, Exclusionary Priorities and the
Antitrust Laws, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 506 (1974).
147. See articles cited note 146 supra. The consensus among economists is that revenue-
maximizing ties should not be per se illegal and may be reasonable under a rule of reason
analysis. If a firm has monopoly power over the tying product it can exact a monopoly price
in that market, and thus does not need the tie. Antitrust should be concerned with the
legitimacy of monopoly power over the tying product and with ties that expand market
power in the market for the tied item, not with the seller's use of a tie to maximize existing
monopoly profits.
148. "A competitive supplier, selling at the prevailing price and attempting to impose a
tie-in upon a buyer, would merely be displaced by a seller who did not." Bowman, supra
note 143, at 20.
149. Austin, supra note 94, at 103-06.
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tional vices: foreclosure and coercion.
In Northern Pacific Railway,150 Justice Black condemned tying
arrangements because they foreclose rival sellers of the tied prod-
uct from "access to the market for the tied product, not because
the party imposing the tying requirements has a better product or
a lower price but because of his power or leverage in another mar-
ket."151 The Court also registered a concern that buyers "are
forced to forego their free choice between competing products '152
and over the coerced abdication of the buyer's discretion to make
an "independent judgment as to the 'tied' product's merits. '153
Since both foreclosure and coercion can occur when the seller has
less than monopoly power over the tying product, the Court was
compelled to reduce the liability standard to "sufficient economic
power." 15
At the minimum, a rule of reason analysis requires a court to
determine whether the tie-in produces leverage effects (either max-
imizing revenues or enhancing market power in the tied product),
foreclosure, or coercion. These effects are the underpinnings of the
per se rule and the possible existence of any one of them is rele-
vant to the rule of reason process of comparing adverse effects and
possible justifications. As the following discussion indicates, the
pro foot ball tie-ins produced both forms of leverage, plus a coer-
cion effect.
b. Failure to Recognize Leverage Effects
By creating a new market in pre-season games and coercing sales
through a tie-in, the seller "jumps" market power from one mo-
nopoly market into a second market.155 It is not, however, the typi-
cal form of monopoly extension where the tie-in is used to deflect
competition away from rival producers of tied products in the sec-
ond market. Instead, the seller is responsible for the creation of a
150. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
151. Id. at 6.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 10, citing Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605
(1953).
154. See Austin, supra note 60, at 1173-78. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements
Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HA.v. L. Rpv. 50, 60-62 (1958).
155. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
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new market which cannot be duplicated by rivals.156 There is an-
other important difference: the production of pre-season games re-
sults in a "static" market, the success of which depends upon the
seller's previous regular season record and which has an inelastic
demand curve which limits production to two or three games.
These built-in limitations on the market power of the suppliers
of the pre-season games suggest that the monopoly-extending lev-
erage effects are modest and that the primary motive for the use of
pre-season tie-ins is to achieve the second leverage objec-
tive-maximization of monopoly revenues. Concerned with adverse
public opinion and the possibility of a drop in sales, sellers are in-
hibited from charging customers the full monopoly price for the
season ticket. By producing pre-season games and imposing the
tie-in, pro football teams can maximize revenues without directly
raising the price of season tickets, and thereby avoid widespread
disenchantment of the fans.
c. The Coercion Effect
As noted, the unique characteristic of the pro football tie is that
the seller exercises an absolute monopoly over both the tying and
tied products. Thus, as the decisions correctly hold, there can be
no foreclosure of nonexistent rivals. 157 There is, however, the possi-
bility that a form of "coercion" has nevertheless been produced.
Supreme Court decisions refer to two undesirable consequences
from seller coercion. One is that the buyer loses the discretion to
examine competing tied products and to reach a non-coerced deci-
sion on the perceived merits of the products.15 Here, as with fore-
closure, the absence of competing products renders concern over
this form of coercion superfluous.
The second form of coercion, less distinctly articulated in the
decisions, is the interference with the buyer's autonomy. In varying
156. Coniglio has been criticized for ignoring the competition from other sports teams in
the area. Bauer, A Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 33 VAND. L. REv. 283, 302 n.60 (1980).
157. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 67 (1977) (White, J., con-
curring); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
158. Id. at 10, citing Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605
(1953).
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degrees of subtlety, the Supreme Court has espoused a "free
trader" principle which seeks, when possible, to skew the inquiry
in a way that protects the purchaser's discretion over product se-
lection and the use of products once purchased.119 This objective
was most noticeable in the decisions of the Warren Court, which
was committed to "equality of opportunity, free access to markets
by competing sellers, and complete freedom of choice by buy-
ers." eo The Sixth Circuit has described the second form of buyer
coercion in these words: "One of the evils inherent in any tying
arrangement is that it forces the buyer to give up his independent
judgment as to whether, or where, to purchase the tied product."161
Thus, any vertical arrangement-such as a pro football ticket tie-
in-that inhibits buyer autonomy is suspect. s1 6
B. The Virginia Ticket Tie-In Compared
Given the factual similarities, the pro football tie-in decisions
provide an argument for exonerating the Virginia type of ticket
priority tying arrangement. However, the rationale of these deci-
sions falls apart under the rule of reason analysis mandated by Su-
preme Court decisions that established the per se rule. According
to the above analysis, both pro football and college sports ticket
ties may produce effects-such as "leverage" and coer-
159. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 67 (1977) (White, J., con-
curring); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
160. Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism,
and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. Rlv. 325, 332 (1968). Sullivan also notes the coercive effects of
tying:
We must therefore begin with the supposition that the hostility to tying embodied in
the act and espoused in the cases may have more to do with notions of appropriate
competitive behavior (conceptions about fair opportunity or access) and with the po-
lar concepts of coercion and free choice, than it has to do with the efficiency or alloca-
tion consequences of competitive structure and process.
L. SuLLIvAN, supra note 38, at 445. See E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS: SELECTED LEGAL
CASES AND ECONOMIC MODELS 199 (1968).
The persistent reduction in the amount of commerce that plaintiff must show is affected
by the tie indicates a growing concern with buyer autonomy. In most markets, for example,
$190,000 of commerce affected (the amount accepted by the Court in Fortner I, see note 90
supra) would be an insignificant foreclosure whether from a tie or a direct sale. To the
coerced buyer, however, any amount represents an infringement on autonomy.
161. Associated Press v. Taft-Ingall's Corp., 340 F.2d 753, 762 (6th Cir. 1965).
162. The professional football cases have been-sharply criticized for failing to recognize
the coercion effect of tying. Bauer, supra note 156, at 302.
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cion-subsumed under the per se rule.16 3 There is one important
difference between the pro football ties and the college ticket re-
straint in that the latter constitutes a price discrimination mecha-
nism-an effect expressly condemned by the Supreme Court in
Fortner IL. 6'
1. Leverage: Maximizing Revenues
In participating in a joint venture with the VSAF to provide sea-
son ticket buyers with a cluster of services and priority ticket sta-
tus, the University of Virginia creates a new market. Similar to the
pre-season pro football games, the market for VSAF services is
largely dependent on the success of the school's athletic depart-
ment in producing attractive sports entertainment. While the new
market is a pure monopoly, it does not involve monopoly extension
effects. To a greater extent than pre-season pro games, VSAF ser-
vices comprise a static market without growth potential. It is the
use of the VSAF tie-in to maximize revenues of the home game
monopoly that best explains the arrangement. The necessity to en-
gage in revenue-maximizing ties is derived from the special pres-
sures involved in participating in "big time" intercollegiate
athletics.
Even more than pro football franchises, college teams like the
University of Virginia's are inhibited by strong external pressures
from directly extracting the full monopoly price from ticket pur-
chasers. It would, for example, create an immediate and strong ad-
verse public reaction if monopoly-power football teams like
Oklahoma or Nebraska were to charge $500 or $1,000 per ticket for
"significant" home games. Likewise, if the University of Virginia
were to set its season basketball ticket price at something like
$2,000, the negative reaction would resound from the Appalachian
Mountains to the Dismal Swamp, and on to the corridors of power
in the General Assembly.
Alternatives to an "up front" or direct method of maximizing
monopoly revenues are limited. Selling tickets on the black mar-
163. One decision, Driskill v. Dallas Cowboy Football Club, Inc., 498 F.2d 321 (5th Cir.
1974) has been criticized as a perversion of the "reasonable business practice rationale."
Ross, supra note 64, at 993.
164. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
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ket, i.e., "ticket scalping," is apparently used by some athletic de-
partments as a means of paying athlete-employees."1 5 Scalping is
both illegal and extremely inefficient and cannot be deemed a fea-
sible means of raising capital or subsidizing employees. A more
practicable option is the tying arrangement, which is extremely ef-
ficient-although it may also be illegal under the antitrust laws.
Hence, the joint venture between the University of Virginia and
the VSAF service organization constitutes a successful, revenue-
maximizing technique. Possible public approbation for the reve-
nue-maximizing effects are further softened and rationalized under
scholarship funding objectives. For example, the literature adver-
tises that "over 2,000 student-athletes have received direct scholar-
ship assistance from the VSAF. . . . Helping student-athletes...
is the VSAF's primary function and the VSAF members' biggest
dividend."'16 Revenue-maximizing burdens are also rendered
palatable by the opportunity to use the payment as a tax
deduction.
In one critical respect, a college priority-point tying arrangement
has an advantage over the pro football ticket tie-ins. By exploiting
the VSAF priority point system, Virginia is able to further maxi-
mize revenues by engaging in price discrimination. Under the point
system, which allows purchasers to amass points and thereby gain
priority according to the amount of contribution and length of par-
ticipation, buyers willing to pay the most to satisfy their desire to
see home games are preferred over those unwilling or unable to
165. "Issuing free game tickets to athletes for the purpose of resale is a common means of
providing extra cash. The practice is especially lucrative at schools where games are regu-
larly sold out and has been known to generate seasonal income in excess of $2,000 per ath-
lete." J. RooNEY, supra note 108, at 86. 0. J. Simpson, winner of the Heisman Trophy at the
University of Southern California in 1968, reportedly said: "I think every player has scalped
tickets in college. Whenever we'd play UCLA, I had friends from UCLA who'd come over
and bring me their tickets because they felt S.C. guys would do better with tickets than they
would." Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), Nov. 3, 1979, § B, at 3, col. 4.
Indeed, every top player at Ohio State-and probably most other major colleges
around the country-received batches of season tickets. In a sense, they become "le-
gal scalpers." It was simple. "If you were a pretty good player, you could get an alum-
nus to take a ticket off your hands for $300 .....
J. Dutso, THE SPORTS FACTORY 49 (1975). See Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d
352, 369 (8th Cir. 1977).
166. VSAF: There's a VSAF District Near You (brochure available from the Virginia Stu-
dent Aid Foundation).
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match payments.
The price discrimination objective puts the ticket tying arrange-
ment squarely within a category of harmful effects recently con-
demned by the Supreme Court. In Fortner II, Justice Stevens said:
"If, as some economists have suggested, the purpose of a tie-in is
often to facilitate price discrimination, such evidence would imply
the existence of power that a free market would not tolerate."10
7
2. Coercion
The ticket priority tie-in can be condemned because of its coer-
cive effects on purchasers. Buyers of season tickets are forced to
forego the opportunity to make an independent judgment on
VSAF membership, thereby losing the protection of the "buyer au-
tonomy" principle espoused by some members of the Supreme
Court. The restraint "distorts the spending decisions from those
that would have prevailed absent the tie."' 6 In this situation, more
than the buyer's decisional autonomy is involved; but for the
forced membership in the VSAF and participation in its priority
system, buyers could obtain season tickets unencumbered by the
additional costs of price discrimination.
VI. CONCLUSION
The production of "big time" intercollegiate sports entertain-
ment is one of the nation's most competitive industries. Operating
as "profit-center" athletic departments, the major entrepreneurs
aggressively compete for talent, customers, and dollars. As partici-
pants in the free market system, these sports enterprises are vul-
nerable to various public laws-including the antitrust laws.
The ticket priority system is a form of conduct that may consti-
tute an antitrust violation. Since it is an extremely complex type of
tying arrangement which, if tested, would be a case of first impres-
sion, predictions on its legality are necessarily tentative. Neverthe-
less, the above discussion analyzes the relevant issues as encom-
passed in Virginia's ticket plan and suggests that a credible a
priori argument can be made for illegality. Of course, each case
167. 429 U.S. at 617.
168. Bauer, supra note 156, at 302.
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must be judged according to its particular facts. College sports en-
trepreneurs should be on notice, however, that the words of the
antitrust statutes possess a "generality and adaptability compara-
ble to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions"1 '9
which, since 1890, have nourished the flexibility to accommodate
new, complex, and seemingly innocuous forms of restraint of trade.
169. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936).
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